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REPLY BRIEF

I.
A.

ARGUMENT

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.
In order to effectively address the defendant's arguments,

it is helpful to lay out the framework under which his arguments
should be analyzed.1
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable
seizures.

United

States

v.

Sharpe,

searches and

470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).

Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.

Katz

v.

United

States,

389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

^he analyticalframeworkwas briefly set out in the Brief of the Appellant. It is set out
again in more detail and with more support in this reply brief because the defendant does not
present some of his arguments in relation to thisframework,thereby implicitly rejecting part of it.

1

In the instant case, Officer Whipple's seizure of the
defendant was a level two investigative stop.
Deitman,
46.

See State

v.

739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); R. 143-

Such stops have been recognized as a limited exception to

the warrant requirement.
App. 1988) (citing Terry

State

v. Sery,

v. Ohio,

758 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah

392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

"The touchstone of . . . [the] analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always *the reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security.'" Pennsylvania
(quoting Terry,

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 (1977)

392 U.S. at 19). To constitute a reasonable

seizure and overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, a level two investigative stop must meet
the following two-prong Terry

test: (A) the initial stop must be

justified by reasonable suspicion; and (B) the police officer's
actions after the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the stop*
1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Terry,

2

State

v\ Case,

884 P.2d 1274,

392 U.S. at 19-20 (1968)).

B.

RESPONSE TO POINT I OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT: OFFICER
WHIPPLE'S LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION.2
Point I of the defendant's argument (the initial seizure of

the defendant was not supported by reasonable suspicion) deals
with the first prong of the Terry

test: the initial stop must be

justified by reasonable suspicion.
1.

The Reasonable Suspicion Standard.

Reasonable suspicion must be based on "objective facts
suggesting

that the individual may be involved in criminal

activity.7' State

v. Menke,

787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Reasonable suspicion is

the "^minimal level of objective justification'" required to
seize a person; it is "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing
by a preponderance of the evidence."

United

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado,
(1984)).

States

v.

Sokolow,

466 U.S. 210, 217

In determining whether there was reasonable suspicion,

the court must view the totality of facts and circumstances.

2

The defendant's contention that this issue should be considered even though he did not
take a cross-appeal is correct in light of the fact that the defendant has raised this issue in his brief.
See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996).
3

Sokolow,

490 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted); State

v.

Contrel,

886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).
As the discussion below illustrates, an examination of the
facts and circumstances in the instant case shows that Officer
Whipple's initial seizure of the defendant was justified by
reasonable suspicion.
2.

The Basis for the Reasonable Suspicion in the Instant
Case.

In the instant case, Officer Whipple's level two seizure of
the defendant was based on an attempt to locate ("ATL"). R. 144145.
In his brief, the defendant argues that the legality of
Officer Whipple's actions "are determined on the basis of the
information which was available to him at the time he detained
defendant," and Officer Whipple "was acting upon an impermissible
assumption when he seized defendant and his vehicle" because he
had not received sufficient information regarding the
observations of Ricky Hafen (the person who initiated the attempt
to locate upon which the initial seizure was based).
Appellee at 4, 6.

4

Brief of

These arguments fail in light of the following principles
which were clarified by the court of appeals in State

v.

Case,

884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994).
If an officer seizes a person based solely on an ATL, the
legality of the seizure "depend[s] on the sufficiency of the
articulable facts known to the individual originating

the

information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon by
the investigating officer."
United
Seel,

States

v. Hensley,

Case,

884 P.2d at 1277 (citing

469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985); State

827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App.), cert,

(Utah 1992)).

denied,

v.

836 P.2d 1383

The investigating officer need not be informed of

the facts known to the originating source.
Supreme Court in Hensley

Id.

at 1277 n.5 ("The

specifically rejected the suggestion

that the investigating officer must actually be informed of the
facts known to the originating source.") (citing Hensley,

4 69

U.S. at 231) . "An officer who receives a flyer or radio dispatch
may take it at face value and act on it forthwith."
n.5.

Id.

at 1277

Then, "if the investigation culminates in arrest and the

legality of the stop is challenged, the State becomes obligated,
albeit after the fact, to show that legally sufficient

5

articulable suspicion prompted issuance of the fire or dispatch
in the first place•"

Id.

Therefore, in determining whether Officer Whipple's seizure
of the defendant was justified by reasonable suspicion, the facts
known to the individual originating the ATL (Ricky Hafen) must be
examined.3

Id.

at 1277; R. 143-144.

At the June 12, 1996, suppression hearing, the following
testimony related to the basis for Hafenfs suspicion that the
defendant had an open alcohol container in his vehicle was
introduced: (1) On Friday, September 30, 1994, Hafen was working
as an employee of the Arbyf s Restaurant located at the corner of
700 South Bluff Street in St. George, Utah; (2) while working at
the drive-through window that evening, Hafen observed the
defendant in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle; (3) the
occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the Arbyfs
Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street; (4) while
the vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Hafen

3

Even if reasonable suspicion was determined on the information Officer Whipple had at
the time of the initial seizure, there was still reasonable suspicion. Officer Whipple recalled that
dispatch broadcast the following information: (1) there was a possible open container subject at
the Arby's restaurant; (2) an Arby's employee had seen an open container in a vehicle; (3) the
vehicle left the drive-through window; (4) the vehicle was a small white compact pickup with a
shell on it; and (v) there were two occupants in the vehicle. R. 144.

6

observed an open can of Keystone beer in the defendant's lap; (5)
Hafen saw the defendant take a drink from that can as he left the
drive-through window and proceeded toward the public street; (6)
at that time, the can of beer appeared to be half-full; and (7)
Mr. Hafen watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public
street, and he did not see the defendant throw the Keystone beer
can out of the vehicle.

R. 143-144.

Under the applicable standard explained above, Ricky Hafen
had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed the
crime of open alcohol container in a vehicle.4

This suspicion

was based on "objective facts" suggesting

that the defendant may

have been involved in criminal activity.

See Menke,

787 P.2d at

4

In fact, in his brief, the defendant states:

Hafen's observations concerning the apparent volume of liquid in the container and
the fact that the suspect vehicle was in motion and traveling in the direction of the
public street when the driver was observed drinkingfromthe container may have
given rise to reasonable suspicion had Officer Whipple received this information
prior to detaining defendant.
Brief of Appellee at 6.

7

541/ Contrel,

886 P,2d at 110, 739 P.2d at 88.

first prong of the Terry
B.

Therefore, the

test has been met.5

RESPONSE TO POINTS II AND III OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT:
OFFICER WHIPPLE'S LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
ILLEGAL IN TERMS OF ITS DURATION OR INTENSITY (OFFICER
WHIPPLE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE STOP WERE REASONABLY RELATED IN
SCOPE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE STOP) .
Points II and III of the defendant's argument (the encounter

was illegal in terms of its duration and intensity) deal with the
second prong of the Terry

test:

the police officer's actions

after the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the stop.
1.

The Analytical Framework for Determining Whether the
Police Officer's Actions After the Stop Were Reasonably
Related in Scope to the Circumstances Justifying the
Stop.

There are no bright line rules or set criteria for
determining whether the police officer's actions after the stop
were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying
the stop.

See Sharpe,

470 U.S. at 685 ("Much as a ^bright line'

rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative

5

The reliability and veracity of Hafen's information should be assumed because he was a
citizen who received no considerationfromthe St. George Police Department for providing this
information. R. 144; State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) ("Reliability and
veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothingfromthe
police in exchange for the information.").

8

detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human
experience must govern over rigid criteria.").

Bright line rules

and set criteria are not very helpful in this analysis because
each case presents a different factual scenario; therefore,
different methods of investigation will be reasonable in
different cases.

See Id.

at 686-87 ("*If the purpose underlying

a Terry stop - investigating possible criminal activity - is to
be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to
detain the individual for longer than the brief time period
involved in Terry and Adams . . .'") (quoting Michigan
Summers,

452 U.S. 692, 700 and n.12 (1981)); Florida

v.
v.

Royer,

460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (In discussing seizures based on
"suspicion short of probable cause," the Court stated: "The scope
of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the
particular facts and circumstances of each case."); Terry,

392

U.S. at 21-22 (The Court implicitly recognized that the level of
permissible intrusion will vary with the facts when it stated:
"And in justifying the particular

intrusion

the police officer

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that

intrusion.)

(emphasis added).

9

Therefore, when determining whether the police officer's
actions after the stop were reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the stop, instead of relying on set
rules and criteria, Utah courts and the United States Supreme
Court have: (a) balanced the need for the detention against the
invasion which the detention entails;6 and (b) determined whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.
of Appellant at 12-13/ Sharpe,

See Brief

470 U.S. at 686 (In rejecting the

establishment of a per se rule on the length of detention, the
Court stated that in assessing whether a level two detention is
too long in duration, "we consider it appropriate to examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.");
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (In determining the reasonableness of the
type of detention, the Court balanced the need for the detention

6

In his brief, the defendant makes several statements regarding the plaintiffs reliance on
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The plaintiff simply cited Mimms to support its
conclusion that in the present case, under this balancing test, the need for the detention
(determining whether the defendant had an open container in his vehicle) outweighed the invasion
with the detention entailed (having the defendant exit his vehicle). See Brief of Appellant at 1316.

10

(officer safety) against t h e invasion which t h e d e t e n t i o n
e n t a i l e d (having t h e d r i v e r exit t h e vehicle) - the Court stated:
" R e a s o i i a b J e i: 1 e s s,

::> f c o u i s e, ci e p e :! "Il

b a ] a i i c e b e 1: w e e n 1: h e

p u b l i c interest a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s *c p e r s o n a l security free
from, a r bi 1.1 a t , ' i nt ei I et encv 11\ I
States

i Ji. S

Brignoni-Ponce,

v

422 U.

11 „'" 0 ••,? 1 ( 111 d i F.cussiiKf

• • : • : s ' "")

"r -,

(quoting Ui :i ited

78 (1975)); Terry,

I I it;1" .iiia.l y t i c a 1 f i" am^wo

392

i k

determining whether the officer's actions during the
i nves ti gat i ve stop were i: easonable, the Court stated that " there
is *no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails.'") (quoting Camera
Municipal
Lopez,

Court,

387 U.S. o ^ , 534-35, 536-376 (1967)); State i

873 P.2d 1127 1132-33 (Utah 1994); State

p^2d 183/

185

v.

(utah App#

1996); State

v. Grovier,

v

Ottesen,

920

808 P.2d 133,

136 (Utah App. 1991)
2.

Officer Whipple's Request that the Defendant Exit His
Vehicle Was Reasonably Related in Scope to the
Circumstances Justifying the Stop.

The plaintiff's initial arguments related to the second
prong of the Terry
Appellant.

test are set ^ut

^P +-K- Brief of the

See Brief of the Appellant at x^ x7.

11

In his brief, the defendant does not present his arguments
related to the second prong of the Terry

test in relation to the

foregoing analytical framework; instead, he basically argues that
an officer on a level two stop may only take certain specific
actions that have been set out in several previous cases and one
statute.

See Brief of the Appellee at 6-15.

The defendant's arguments are thus based on the false
premise that the second prong of the Terry

test is analyzed by

using set rules and criteria regarding what an officer may do
during a level two stop rather than determining on a case-by-case
basis whether the detention was reasonable under analytical
framework set out above.

See discussion above.

As the discussion below illustrates, the defendant's
arguments fail.
The defendant relies on State

v. Johnson,

805 P.2d 761 (Utah

1991) apparently for the proposition that during a level two
seizure such as the one which took place in the instant case,
police officers can only demand an explanation of the motorist's
actions, "^request [a] driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation,'" and "[a]fter he
is cleared through this process, the motorist *must be allowed to

12

proceed

without being subject to further delay

for additional questioning."
(quoting State

v, Johnson,

Brief of the Appellee ^ .

8 05 I .2d 7 6 3 , ; '»

.

- > - ..

The defendant's reliance on this language is misplaced.
This lang uage 0:1: :t ] ] appl i es to i: ou t:i lie t t a t f ;i < • .stops where there
is no reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, and the
language i s perm i ss:i v e , not i estr I cti v e
defendant quotes from Johnson

IIi

does not appear in that case;

however, it does appeal : :i n several other cases,
originally appeared in State

I anquaqe 1:1 : .e

v, Robinson,

I v : "-- :.a-e

797 P.2d 431 (Utah App.

1990) as follows:
An officer
conducting
a routine
traffic
stop may
request a driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.
United
States
v, Guzman,864
F.2d 1512, 1513 (10th Cir. 1988).
However, once the driver has produced a valid license
and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, *he
must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being
subject to further delay by police for additional
questioning.' Id.
Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after
the fulfillment
of the
purpose of the traffic
stop is justified under the
Fourth Amendment only if the detaining
officer
has a
reasonable
suspicion
of serious
criminal
activity.
Id.

13

State

v. Robinson,

added).7

797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis

When viewed in context in its entirety, it is apparent

that the language relied on by the defendant applies to routine
traffic cases where there is no reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity.8

The seizure in the instant case was not a

routine traffic stop, and there was reasonable suspicion of an
open container violation; therefore, this language does not apply
to restrict Officer Whipple's actions in the instant case as the
defendant seems to argue that it does.

Furthermore, even if this

language did apply to the instant case, it is permissive, not
restrictive (it says what an officer may do - it does not
restrict the officer to those specified actions in every case).

7

In other cases in which this language or substantially similar language appears, it is also
prefaced by the statement: "an officer conducting a routine traffic stop." See e.g., State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Utah 1995);
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v. Patefield, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Sepulveda,
842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992).
8

In Chapman, after this language was set out, the court stated: "While the present case is
not a routine traffic stop, these same principles apply." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 952. The plaintiff
contends that this statement does not refer to the list of steps an officer may take on routine traffic
stop; instead, it refers to the following general principle that was set out in the same paragraph:
"Once a stop is made, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id.

14

The defendant's reliance on State

v. Godina-Luna,

652 (Utah App. 1992) is misplaced because Godina-Luna
factually distinguishable from the instant case.

826 P 2d
is

In

Godina-Luna,

the deputy stopped the car iii which the defendant was riding
Id.

because he thought the driver might be intoxicated.
However, after stopping the car the officer immediately
Id,

that the occupants of the vehicle were sober

at 653.
concluded

At that

point, the purpose of the initial stop (to determine whether the
driver was intoxicated) was satisfied, and the deputy had no
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity,

Jd. at 655.

Nevertheless, the deputy continued to detain the occupants and
asked them whether they had any alcohol, firearms or drugs in the
vehicle.

I d. A 1: 654 . The court held that the fur ther cie ten tion

and questioning was illegal because prior

;

the further

d 'Ll L e 11L i i J i) 11111 i i.-j n e t ) 1 i u n i tii j ,, i In f n j i f M I ,S e \

i 11 i t J ( i 1

11" i > | > 11«-id

been satisfied and there w a s no reasonable suspicion of other
c:i: imina ] act i v i t\

5- a- s I d

at 654 55 ,

• :'

•

The instant case is factually distinguishable from
"TIH de 1 ei idLiJj) was .«J i ,,ed Ix-j^au, \ llieii1 wa

rcasniiidlj 11

suspicion that he had an, open container in hi s vehicle.
I - ) 4-4 b; d i s c u s s i o i i at : ve

The pii ipoM
15

Godina-

See R,

r hi-1 111 J t: j a l se i z\\ re

;

-

was to confirm or dispel that suspicion.

See Menke,

787 P.2d at

543 ("The very purpose of level two investigations is to verify
or dispel the officers' suspicions.").

However, Officer Whipple

could not immediately confirm or dispel his suspicion because the
odor of the Arby's food was masking the odor of the alcohol.
145-46.

R.

Therefore, Officer Whipple had the defendant exit the

vehicle to separate him from the odor of the Arby's food.

Jd.

Prior to having the defendant exit the vehicle, the purpose of
the initial stop had not been satisfied, and there was reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had an open container in his
vehicle.

Therefore, the basis for the holding in

Godina-Luna

does not exist in the instant case, and the defendant's reliance
on that case does not support his argument.
Finally, the defendant cites Terry

and Section 77-7-15 of

the Utah Code in support of his apparent argument that peace
officers engaged in a level two stop may not "search for evidence
on any level other than that which is implied by the authority to
stop a suspect and demand his name, address, and an explanation
of the actions which give rise to the officer's suspicion."
Brief of the Appellee at 13-14.

16

Neither the courts n ~ ^ ^ h ~ "'egislature h a s set such rigid
rules or parameters on what -

officer m a y do on a level

stop,

.ie 1 anguage i n Section '

S e e discussion above-

the Utah Code is permissive, n o t restrictive
off:

•

of

Every police

icting a Il e we J !:: « «: s top • :i s i lot limited !:: D demand i ng

the suspects name, address and an explanation of h i s actions.
See e g i Lopez, 8 7 3 I 2d at 1132-33 (ai i offi cer conducting a
routine traffic stop m a y request a driver's license inj vehicle
and in in
a warrants check if that check does n o t unreasonably extend the
detention); Bountiful
App.

"y

v. Maestas,

788 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah

1990) (when officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's

breath, reasonable suspicion arose, and at: 1:1 lat point, the
officer was justified 1n detaining the defendant for a reasonable
period of time
Agai

:

administer field sobriety t e s t s ) .
\ 111qu;L L \ i;1. wlipt hei: 1 he M . i:uie w a s i eason'iab 11

under the circumstances.

Mimms,

434 U . S . at 108; Terry,

392 U . S .

all 19, In cit't.ei in i n i ii<| whet lu"i f hr uoizur e w<a.s reasonable, .it • :
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the framework set
t HI it ril \iv

,'iee d i s c u s s ! on ai J ;;>\/e

17

S u r h an •m11<11 Y M JI. S I 11 ust.rat: e s

that the seizure in the instant case was reasonable.

Id.;

Brief

of the Appellant at 12-17
II.

CONCLUSION

See Brief of Appellant at 17.

DATED this

5"

day of

EL, 1997.

>cful E. Dame
Pcful
City Prosecutor
Certificate of Delivery

On the

*T

day of

/0fa

, 1997, I caused two true
and exact copies of the foregoing
ng REPLY BRIEF to be delivered to
Gary W. Pendleton, 150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George,
Utah.

/V

Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor
Certificate of Delivery

5L

I hereby certify that on the
day of ^
oing^R
1997, one original and seven copies of the foregoing'REPLY
BRIEF
were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Robin Hutcheson,
Deputy Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite
400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor

18

